

Training for Stability Operations: Lessons Learned from International Development

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ABSTRACT

U.S. Department of Defense directive 3000.05 established stability operations as a core competency for the U.S. military. The *U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual 3-07* develops the doctrine and establishes stability operations as one of the three basic operations carried out by U.S. forces (in addition to offensive and defensive operations). The mission that coalition forces are facing in Iraq and Afghanistan depends upon their skills in conducting stability operations. Lt. General Stanley McChrystal has emphasized that it is not the combat skills and weapons of the troops that will determine who will win in Afghanistan, but rather the Afghan people. Unlike more traditional missions such as attack or defend, this mission requires skills for collaboration and transition of responsibilities as opposed to skills for dominating a situation. These skills imply different knowledge and aptitudes.

This paper draws upon examples from the authors' work in less-developed countries undergoing various stages of change, from peaceful to conflictual, over the past 30 years. It describes how the lessons learned could be used to structure a training program for stability operations. These lessons learned have been summarized in two reports for the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

In this paper, three broad areas of required knowledge drawn from this report are discussed: constituencies, conditions of the society, and motivations of the multiple constituencies. Similarly, three broad categories of skills are discussed: provision of public goods and services, managing political participation and accountability, and safety/security. For these skills, examples are presented from the report, along with options for achieving results and the tradeoffs that need to be made. We use these examples, tradeoffs, and options to identify potential tasks and conditions for training.

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INTRODUCTION

Stability Operations as a Core Military Competency

The U.S. Department of Defense directive 3000.05 (DOD, 2005) established stability operations as a core competency for the U.S. military. The *U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual 3-07* (HQDA, 2008) develops the doctrine and establishes stability operations as one of the three basic operations carried out by U.S. forces (in addition to offensive and defensive operations). The mission that coalition forces are facing in Iraq and Afghanistan depends upon their skills in conducting stability operations. Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal has emphasized to his troops that it is not their combat skills and weapons that will determine who wins in Afghanistan, but rather the Afghan people (CDRUSCENTCOM, 2009). Unlike more traditional missions such as attack or defend, this mission requires skills for collaboration and transition of responsibilities as opposed to skills for dominating a situation. In turn, these skills imply a very different knowledge base and aptitude.

An Approach to Training for Stability Operations

This paper describes an approach for developing training for stability operations that is based on applying the lessons learned by civilian Institutional Development Organizations (IDOs), which have been developing methods for growing stable government institutions for the past 30 years.

In this paper, we relate this experience to knowledge about the local environment that is necessary for the success of a stability operation. We illustrate variations in that knowledge for different localities.

We also describe tradeoffs that leaders have to make with respect to three critical competencies of a democratic government:

- Providing goods and services
- Strengthening political participation and accountability
- Providing safety and security for the population.

Finally, we suggest training scenarios that focus on making decisions about these tradeoffs in the context of different local environments, thus requiring the students to apply their knowledge to demonstrate the critical skills.

LOCAL KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED OF STABILITY OPERATION LEADERS

Knowledge of the Local Constituencies

Initial mission operational assessments by peacekeeping forces should incorporate an evaluation of several factors, including identification of the ethnic and religious groups and the history of interaction among divided groups. This evaluation should include the international context within which conflicts among these groups have evolved.

The level of sophistication of historical governments can be a useful guide to the expectations of the governments for a variety of services. These expectations should be considered in prioritizing efforts to achieve stability. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate some of these differences. Figure 1 illustrates a group in Iraq that is attending deliberations on the government and indicates the influential role that religious figures often play. Figure 2—a photo of community deliberations in Uganda—is indicative of the type of participation in government by town residents that is often not part of formal government in these countries, even though many countries have traditional democratic consensus mechanisms for decision making on local issues.



Figure 1. Iraq Community Leadership



Figure 2. Ugandan Community Leadership

Sources of Authority and Legitimacy

The type of government that stability operations will typically seek to establish is based on the fundamentals of the nation-state and Western democracy, with formal institutions in the three separate branches of government subject to the rule of law (Weber, 1918). However, in much of the non-Western world, authority and legitimacy flow from indigenous sources grounded in religion, ethnicity, tribal or kinship affiliation, and/or territorial identity. In post-conflict countries where the effective reach of the formal state is often limited, where the formal state has been damaged or destroyed, or where the formal state behaves in a predatory manner, traditional sources of authority can provide an alternative to, or a refuge from, state incapacity or depredation. These traditional functions often combine separate branches known to western democracies in a

single authority-type of government that is often replicated at higher—even national—levels. The checks on power in these systems are cultural, can be effective, and can even achieve the aims of a democratic system at the tribal and local level, but will often fall prey to abuses as lack of checks allow corruption and other abuse of power in systems where leaders cannot easily be held accountable by their constituents.



Figure 3. Local Leaders in Guinea

Conditions of the Local Society

A common feature of failed and fragile states is the existence of deep societal cleavages among ethnic, religious, and territorially based groups; thus, an important macro-level issue for diplomatic peace negotiators and peacekeeping forces is determining how to structure the state so as to accommodate the pressures from these various groups for autonomy, self-determination, and enfranchisement (i.e., political, cultural, linguistic, religious, and/or economic).

Motivations and Expectations of the Constituencies

Central to many stability operations is supporting change in leadership, governance processes, and other key aspects of society that reduce motivations for violence and increase the stakes in stability of both leaders and their constituencies. Economic well-being is a powerful motivator throughout the world, but other motivators need to be considered for successful stability operations. Religious motivations are a significant factor in many conflicts and are often used to define identities and induce divisions.

There are strong motivations to preserve cultures, particularly when the cultures are being attacked by economic, political, or even climactic pressures. These

motivations may conflict with efforts to develop alternative political and economic structures. Sacred values can often trump even significant physical and economic deprivation as a motivator to resist changing culture (Atran et al., 2007)

A fit with expectations is important to mitigating possibilities for renewed conflict, reestablishing trust in government, and creating legitimacy. For example, a well-recognized conflict driver and contributor to state fragility is the distribution of services that systematically excludes certain ethnic, tribal, and/or religious groups. If a new interim government does not address the expected redress of perceived past unfairness and discrimination, it risks losing support and legitimacy among these groups. Expectations for power and water systems among sophisticated communities will be higher than those in low-economic areas that the state may have neglected and will differ from country to country (e.g., compare expectations of services in Bosnia to those in Angola after their respective conflicts).

Attention to expectations leads outside intervening forces to consider whose expectations need to be taken into account. As noted above, some citizens will expect a new political order and that the government will right old wrongs and correct past inequities. Others will look to the state to retain key features of the former regime and preserve their privileges. Still others will anticipate reforming the underlying principles on which the state is based; for example, according religion a central position in state institutions (the Taliban in Afghanistan) or building a multi-racial society (post-apartheid South Africa). Post-Saddam Iraq is a good example of the challenges of different expectations within a society; the Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish visions of an effective and legitimate state are quite different.

GOVERNING COMPETENCIES NEEDED FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

Provide Public Goods and Services

Failed states (which are the environment for stability operations) highlight the importance of positive relationships between a government and its citizens for stability. The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation's Development Assistance Committee has explored state-society linkages in detail to explain why some states are fragile and others are stable. At the core of these linkages is a "social contract" between the state and its citizens. This contract is a product of three interacting components (OECD, 2008):

- Expectations that citizens have of the state

- State capacity to provide services within a secure environment and to obtain sufficient resources from its population and territory to provide these services
- Political will to direct resources and capacity to meet citizens' expectations.

When these three components are in balance—that is, when citizens' expectations match up with state capacity and political will—then the state exhibits resilience.

Inadequate quantity of services may be the proximate causal link between public services provision problems and tensions that may lead to conflict. For example, flare-ups have occurred in Kosovo from time to time over issues of real or perceived neglect of basic city services in municipalities where the Serbian minority is concentrated (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009b).

For water, electricity, sewerage, and telephone service, the measure of coverage is delivery to the household (dwelling unit). The less economically developed the society, the more likely it is that one or more of these household-level services actually will be delivered, not to the residence, but to the neighborhood. Standpipes in each neighborhood may be the expected and only available water service. Neighborhood toilets and washing facilities may be the level of service typical of the area or of most areas outside densely populated and generally better-served urban areas. In fragile states such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Afghanistan, basic services are seriously deficient, even in middle-class areas of the capital and in most towns, and virtually nonexistent elsewhere (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009b).

Tradeoffs in Providing Services

There are two sets of trade-offs among intervention options discussed in this section: short-term versus long-term and large-scale construction versus repair and rehabilitation.

Options for Providing Services

Conflict and wars destroy basic infrastructure, disrupt the delivery of core services (e.g., health, education, electricity, water, and sanitation), and impede the day-to-day routines associated with making a living. The inability of fragile and post-conflict states to provide fundamental public goods and services has impacts on the immediate tasks facing stability operations. In permissive environments (where the host government has requested aid), humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often take the lead in meeting citizens' basic needs in the absence of state capacity. In

non-permissive situations, military forces generally play a role in providing basic services directly and/or providing protection to NGOs, while also engaging in offensive and defensive kinetic operations. One danger in this combination of functions is that insurgent forces may then regard these military-provided services and the NGOs as legitimate targets for attack (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009b).

While reliance on external actors may be a necessity early in stability operations, ultimately, the capacity of the public sector in the conflict-affected country must be rebuilt or created to take the lead in providing public goods and services. Effective service provision is associated with a functioning civil service, basic budgeting and management systems, control of corruption, adequate municipal infrastructure, availability of health care and schooling, provision of roads and transportation networks, and, eventually, attention to social safety nets.

Manage Political Participation and Accountability

Governance refers to the processes and rules through which state and non-state actors in a society wield power and authority and how they influence and enact governmental policies and decisions. Governance is a broader concept than government and includes formal guidance (e.g., a constitution) and formal structures that perform government functions (i.e., the three branches of government: legislature, executive, and judiciary).

Governance extends beyond the role and actions of formal public sector institutions, structures, and processes. It concerns how societies organize to pursue collective goals and interests and is the process through which a government may achieve legitimacy. Some of these processes and institutions may be governmental, others may not. Governance combines public administration and state structures; politics and the exercise of power and authority; policymaking and implementation; and the relationships between government and civil society. In fragile and failed states, weak governance is recognized as a contributor to conflict and civil war and has highlighted the need for reformed governance in establishing peace and pursuing state reconstruction.

Tradeoffs for Political Participation and Accountability

Peace accords lay out the long-term roadmap for returning to peace and achieving state resilience, often as noted above, leaving the details related to the machinery of government relatively vague beyond

statements about reform and modernization to reinforce checks and balances and increase capacity.

Short Term versus Long Term. One critical trade-off is between short term and long term services. The short-term need to provide services immediately usually takes precedence, and this may lead military forces to turn to international NGOs and contractors to step in and fill the gaps. In some cases, forces may find it easier to provide these themselves if civilian organizations are reluctant and where funding is available to begin to support service delivery. To the extent that the host country government is involved, that engagement tends to be with the sectoral agencies within the executive branch responsible for service delivery. Yet, for long-term government effectiveness and sustainability, other functional executive agencies (e.g., ministries of finance, planning, trade) need to be included, as well as legislative bodies. In addition, to establish the building blocks for responsive and representative government, avenues for citizen participation and for effective oversight of government need to be opened up sooner rather than later (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009ba).

Urgent Needs versus Fostering Legitimacy. A second related tradeoff is between meeting urgent needs and fostering legitimacy in the political machinery of the state. The effect of military forces or outside foreign civilian organizations largely bypassing host country government is that citizens see the government as ineffectual and irrelevant to meeting their needs. During the period following the establishment of an interim government, however, it is important to find ways to include public agencies and officials in reconstruction planning, budgeting, and decision-making so that citizens can perceive their government as responding to their needs and those of the country. These perceptions contribute to rebuilding citizens' trust in the state as the legitimate governing authority. Of course, there are numerous obstacles in dealing with this trade-off. Budget execution capacity is likely to be weak even though government officials may want a larger role in managing reconstruction resources. Newly installed ministry heads may be more interested in political power and patronage than in effectively fulfilling their service delivery responsibilities. Basic capacity to provide services may be critically weak. Finally, processes to bring legitimacy to the election of leaders (e.g., elections) may lag behind the response required to address urgent needs tied to restive groups that can be exploited by those who profit from violence, making it hard to involve legitimate leadership in the governance of important "bread and butter" issues such as basic services (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009a).

Options for Political Participation and Accountability

There are several options that can restore the machinery of government to enable basic government decision making; help connect new leaders to citizens; address immediate capacity building; and lay the groundwork for creating legitimacy. The degree of destruction and debilitation of the institutions of government will strongly affect how quickly and easily peacekeeping forces and their host country counterparts can pursue these options.

Transfer Political and Budget Authority to the Host Country Government as Soon as Possible. As noted above regarding tradeoffs, the influx of donor resources programmed according to donor procedures runs the risk of marginalizing the new government. Post-conflict states share the problem faced by all donor-dependent developing countries that have few resources: political leaders and legislatures have very little power regarding priority-setting and spending because the majority of resources come from donors. It is important for legitimacy and trust-building purposes to provide new governments with opportunities to exercise decision-making authority. Providing such opportunities does not mean giving up all control, which would be unwise since budget planning and management capacity is weak and corruption is a serious risk.

Build Key Capacities to Enable the Exercise of Political and Budget Authority. Faced with the broken and destroyed government machinery found in post-conflict states, it is difficult for military actors to determine where to target immediate efforts. In tandem with the transfer of authority, capacity building is needed to enable executive agencies, legislatures, and justice organizations to function. For example, basic revenue collection and management capacity is important for service delivery, as noted, but it is also critical for political legitimacy and accountability as a demonstration to citizens that the state seeks to meet their needs responsibly.

Provide Safety and Security for the Population

As a state governs security, it assumes a monopoly on the use of force and authorizes certain organizations to use force in defense of the state or to maintain public order (Weber, 1918). While other public services may be completely absent, it is likely that there will be a state or non-state force in place that has provided public security of some sort. Indeed, an unstable post-conflict environment has typically created conditions that encouraged groups to vie for a monopoly on the use of

force, and this condition has contributed to the instability.

Effective civilian control and structuring of the security sector will depend on how well stability operation leaders incorporate an understanding of the host country's institutions and the historical patterns. The strength of these patterns should not be underestimated because they not only have the impetus of producing income and power for local security forces and their leaders, but they represent ways that the society has developed to "gets things done," including corrupt relationships that people have come to accept and which they have learned to manage. Some of these patterns, such as patronage relationships, have a long legacy in most countries with authoritarian histories. Due to this legacy, good governance will ultimately be provided only as far as the societal actors revise their notions of what public security is and how it operates, and come to trust the government to provide for basic needs.

Personal security will probably be the most urgent issue for citizens in post-conflict society. It is one of the functions of governance that affects early perceptions of the legitimacy of the state and thus will almost always be one of the first and most important public tasks. Unlike other public services (e.g., water or power) that may be entirely absent, only in rare instances will there not be an armed and organized group using force to address public order and control, often establishing the parameters for security with little public accountability. Those providing security will often lay claim to leadership, as well as have the support of citizens who see them as the only immediate option for protection of persons and property—however undemocratic and unaccountable they may be. Consequently, stability operations forces will immediately be required to deal with patterns of expectations—particularly when a group has built some legitimacy through successfully providing security—that will affect the scope and success of initial programs and will immediately bring to the fore difficult tradeoffs and decisions pivoting on priorities around short-term and long-term goals.

Tradeoffs for Providing Security

The most critical tradeoff faced by leaders of stability operations is choosing between the urgent need to address security—possibly lending legitimacy to less-than-democratic processes and actors, redundant layers of security provision, and organizations that have reputations for corruption and unprofessionalism—and establishing legitimacy for patterns of governance and

actors that support accountability, transparency, and other processes critical to good governance.

Options for Providing Security

For near-term provision of security, several options can be considered. They include co-opting local, non-state security forces, supporting existing forces with centralized reporting, and establishing and supporting mechanisms to control the power of entrenched security actors while installing legitimate security forces. An essential goal for security missions is preventing violence from becoming a viable mechanism for achieving the goals of competing political factions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

Adapting Training to the Field Rotation Cycle

Our strategies for modeling and simulation reflect early work on determining the right mix of Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) simulation (Frank et al., 2000). This analysis was driven by matching the training methods and technologies to the training context. The Army Force Generation model provides the context for this analysis (Johnson, 2006).

Reset-Train Phase Training

For units in the Reset-Train phase, the training has to be focused on the core Mission Essential Task List (METL) for the unit. In this phase, the training is focused on adaptability to the full spectrum of operations and the broadest range of cultural models (Vane, 2010; Tillson et al., 2005). The three governance competencies described above provide a general structure for assessing the coverage of the training.

There are simulation capabilities that link social models to war-game simulations that can support training on the Provide Safety and Security competency, so this paper will address issues related to the other two competencies. The Joint Non-kinetic Effects Model (JNEM) assesses the mood of the population along several dimensions and then uses the results of that assessment to determine whether the insurgent forces are supported or revealed (Henry & Chamberlain, 2008). In this model, winning the hearts and minds of the population is linked back to factors relevant to the success of kinetic operations. This approach to demonstrating outcomes is effective for scenarios that focus on security operations where there is an armed insurgency.

Relevant social science models can be selected as frameworks to provide appropriate responses to the interventions selected by the trainees. Constructive simulations incorporating these social-science models can be driven by notional data that are tailored to cover the full spectrum of operations and cultural issues, and to reveal to the learners the consequences of their actions.

An important aspect of training adaptable leaders is linking general but relevant social-science theory to their manifestations in practical applications. A challenge is “chunking” the training so that learners can focus on recognition and reaction to specific aspects of a situation before integrating their learning in a more general simulation (Ambrose et al., 2009).

We have been developing strategies and simulations that support individual practice on collective tasks as preparation for collective simulations. These individual practice simulations can focus on specific tasks and outcomes and support the training “chunk” concept. These “chunks” need to be linked to relevant social-science theory. Recent research emphasizes the need to interleave interactive practice with education on basic principles (Rittle-Johnson and Koedinger, 2009). This training also needs to adapt to the knowledge, skills, and experience of the learners (Frank et al., 2008). This is particularly true in the Reset-Train phase, since the focus of reset is that the unit will be incorporating new personnel with different backgrounds and experience.

Ready Phase Training

For units in the Ready phase, the training has to be focused on the Theater METL. In this phase, the range of scenarios can be narrowed to those aspects that are relevant to the theater where the unit will be deployed. In this phase, the simulations should be driven by theater-specific data. There are many sources of data available that should be incorporated into the models. Our experience in creating social models for assessment of public health interventions is that correlating and geo-referencing these data has to be done carefully so that simulations will reflect the interaction between the human terrain and the physical (Wheaton et al., 2009).

Available Phase Training

The simulations in this phase focus less on training general principles and more on conducting “what-if” planning, mission rehearsal, and sustainment training. In this phase, the emphasis is on simulations that can be closely linked with operational systems, such as the GIS-Enabled Modeling and Simulation (GEMS) tools (Stanzione & Johnson, 2007). These tools can input

results from GIS databases and geo/imagery processing tools to provide the geo-referenced data needed for the simulation. For sustainment training, the output from the simulations should be able to stimulate operational systems.

Modeling and Simulation Strategies

A major design goal for scenario-based training is revealing to the student the consequences of his or her actions. This is often called outcome-based training (Vane, 2010). This is a significant training design challenge when tradeoffs involve both near-term and long-term consequences, which is the situation for stability operations.

A strategy that we have been developing to deal with this challenge is to include multiple scenarios that share a common context, but at different points in time. For example, a single context may be supported by scenarios at three phases of a stability operation:

- Planning a stability operation
- Implementing a security zone or service project or supporting elections
- The final stages of transferring responsibility to the host nation.

This approach is complex in that the second scenario is dependent upon the results of the first, and similarly, the third scenario is dependent upon the first two scenarios. An approach that we have developed is to score each of the scenarios separately using a multidimensional scoring system and then use the results of the scores on a scenario to select an appropriate variation on the following scenario. This requires that the scenarios are parameterized in ways that are aligned with the scoring dimensions.

This strategy is tempered by experience in the development of simulations to support “what-if” simulations to support decision-making on public health policies in the context of epidemics (Roberts et al., 2009). Several lessons were learned from the application of simulations of large populations to support public health decision-making and counter-terrorism:

- The simulations should be supported by validated social-science models
- The simulations need to be configured to support the potential learner actions.
- The simulations should be driven by ground-truthed data.

Social Science Frameworks for Simulations

The first step in addressing this is the development of a relevant conceptual framework that identifies the major social, behavioral, cultural, and institutional influences on individual and social behavior. A governance framework has proven to serve us well as a conceptual framework to guide data gathering and analysis. These frameworks will ultimately guide the development of simulation models relevant to conflict or reduction of conflict.

The frameworks should be supported by validated social-science models that can guide the behavior of constructive simulations and the data collection needed to populate the models. For example, the relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970) is relevant to the Supply Goods and Services competency. Relative deprivation refers to differences in the availability of services. It also refers to changes in the availability of services to a group over time (or changes that are the result of a political, military, economic, or environmental event). The data needed to model the effects of essential services, or lack thereof, on civilian population’s attitudes and behaviors require not simply a listing of the available or unavailable services and a comparison with expressed needs, but also data on such things as (1) previous availability of services compared to the present, (2) the distribution of those services pre- and post-conflict among various socioeconomic, ethnic, and/or religious groups; (3) the capacity of the government to deliver services; (4) the history of that service delivery prior to conflict; (5) citizens’ prior and current experience with, and attitudes toward, government; and (6) citizens’ access to the services in question from alternative sources (e.g., traditional providers, private sector, international NGOs).

However, these perceptions of inequity, as well as their causes and particular impact on a self-identified group (e.g., area of a country, religious affiliation, tribal affiliation), do not automatically and directly affect actual behavior important to stability operations (ranging from peaceful attempts to change leadership through the ballot box to illicit actions to assassinate specific actors or to overthrow the entire regime). Behavioral choices are mediated by such influences as opinion leaders, the degree to which the state is accepted as legitimate even though its current behavior may not be acceptable, and the experience with the effectiveness of non-violent means in the past to effect change. Varying these influences and having the behavioral simulations react appropriately will encourage adaptability in the learners.

Configuring Simulations to Support Interventions

For example, if a potential intervention includes travel restrictions for different groups between different locations, then the simulation needs to model the travel patterns of relevant social groups. Similarly, the relative deprivation theory requires that social groups be able to compare the services that they are receiving with services that other groups are receiving and react to the perceived differences.

Data Collection to Support Simulations

The simulations should be driven by ground-truthed data. There are a variety of sources of published and unpublished material, campaign histories, and public opinion polls that can be examined in depth for qualitative and quantitative values on these variables. For example, multiple opinion and attitude surveys were collected in Iraq between 2003 and 2010 (recent examples are ABC/BBC/ARD, 2009; ABC/BBC/NHK, 2009; Livingston et al., 2010; O'Hanlon & Livingston, 2010). These surveys covered people's perceptions of formal and informal leaders, the different levels of government in Iraq, and U.S. military and civilian forces. Variables included the extent to which individuals relied on public officials, family, religious leaders, tribal leaders, and others for a variety of purposes, including leadership, delivery of services, addressing social issues, and so forth. The World Bank conducted similar surveys in the same time period. ABC/BBC news has conducted opinion surveys covering some of these topics at least twice yearly in Iraq and Afghanistan for at least the past 6 years.

Using these opinion surveys as data in a modeling exercise requires first the conceptual model development, then the specification of variables, then the identification of specific data sources, such as public opinion polls, that provide measures of specific variables. Finally, data from different sources have to be normalized to support the simulations (Wheaton et al., 2009).

Training for Adaptability

The focus on an expeditionary army prepared for asymmetric warfare requires training that develops adaptive leaders (Tillson et al., 2005). A strategy that we have been developing to deal with this challenge is to support deliberate practice in decision-making with multiple scenarios in a variety of contexts. Each of these scenarios must be furnished with appropriate cues to guide the learner to appropriate decisions. The training may make those cues available to the learner, or may require some effort by the learner to obtain those cues. We have been developing ontologies that

enforce consistency in the relations of multiple categories of parameters. For example, the mission and the task organization (and associated resources) to conduct the mission are two categories of parameters that have strong links in terms of how the mission is executed. Even with the constraints imposed by the ontology, there are many possible scenarios. The three competencies described above provide a high-level structure for a set of training modules.

CONCLUSIONS

Stability operations recently joined offensive and defensive operations as core competencies for the U.S. military. This change reflects the current operating environment of coalition forces and is expected to represent the majority of U.S. military missions in the future. This change in doctrine has significant implications for the training of U.S. forces.

Civilian organizations working for the U.S. State Department have accumulated experience that is relevant to military training on stability operations. This experience includes working with less-developed countries and collaborating with coalition military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In this paper, we have described a concept of governance competencies that has served us well as a conceptual framework to guide data gathering and analysis. This framework is aligned with the U.S. Army doctrine on stability operations, as defined in FM 3-07.

Three essential competencies for governance are the basis of this framework. For these competencies, we have described options and tradeoffs that can guide the development of training scenarios, as well as the collection and alignment of data for scenarios supporting these competencies and associated tradeoffs.

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